When Frames (Don’t) Matter: Querying the Relationship between Ideas and Policy by Bergeron, Henri et al.
Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques publiques  
 
LIEPP Working Paper 
January 2014, nº18 
 
When Frames (Don’t) Matter: Querying the 
Relationship between Ideas and Policy 
 
 
Henri Bergeron 
Sciences Po – LIEPP / CSO 
Henri.bergeron@sciencespo.fr 
 
Patrick Castel 
Sciences Po – LIEPP / CSO 
Patrick.castel@sciencespo.fr 
 
Abigail Saguy 
UCLA 
Saguy@soc.ucla.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sciences Po | LIEPP 
27 rue Saint-Guillaume 
75337 Paris Cedex 07 
Tel : 01 45 49 83 61 
www.sciencespo.fr/liepp 
 
© 2014 by Henri Bergeron, Patrick Castel and Abigail Saguy. All rights reserved. 
When Frames (Don‘t) Matter 
Querying the Relationship between Ideas and Policy 
 
Henri Bergeron, Sciences Po 
Patrick Castel, Sciences Po 
Abigail Saguy, UCLA
*
 
 
DRAFT: DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM A. SAGUY 
(Saguy@soc.ucla.edu) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
*
 Equal co-authorship: authors are listed alphabetically but contributed equally to the paper. A great 
thank to the following scholars who have valuably contributed to previous versions of this paper: 
Louise Hervier, Cornelia Woll, Emiliano Grossman and other members of the CEE at Sciences Po; to 
the colleagues who commented the paper at the Council for European Studies’ and at the Society for the 
Study of Social Problems’ conferences.  And special mention to Connie Nathanson (Columbia 
University) and to Eward Walker (UCLA). 
 
 1 
Abstract 
How social phenomenon are defined – or framed – is assumed to inform 
subsequent policy. Yet, the actual relationship between framing and policymaking 
remains understudied and undertheorized. This article aims to remedy this deficit by 
drawing on three broad sociological and political science literatures that rarely speak 
to each other but which together provide insights and theoretical leverage for 
addressing this question. Specifically, it draws on the literature on social movements 
and framing, social problem construction, and political theory (on agenda setting, 
ideas-driven policy, and policy instruments). It presents theoretical propositions for 
predicting relative consistency between dominant social problem frames and 
subsequent public policy, in order to animate and guide subsequent research. It argues 
that the relationship between social problem framing and policymaking – whether 
seemingly consistent or inconsistent – must be systematically problematized.  
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 2 
Introduction 
There is growing interest in the role ideas – or frames – play in political and 
institutional change (Fligstein and McAdam 2011; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; 
Lounsbury, Ventresca and Hirsch 2003; McAdam and Scott 2005; Schmidt 2010). 
Research on the social construction of social problems has demonstrated that the way 
in which an issue is framed has important implications for the policy solutions that are 
subsequently devised (Gusfield 1981; Stone 1989). For instance, in his classic study, 
Joseph Gusfield showed that, by imposing an account of automobile accidents as 
caused by ―drunk drivers,‖ the crusade against drunk driving favored policies that 
would penalize individuals who drive while intoxicated, rather than, say, improving 
automobile manufacturing (Gusfield 1981). It is indeed largely because frames are 
thought to shape policy action that they are at the heart of much social mobilization 
(Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Snow et al. 1986).  
Recent work on the framing of obesity in the United States supports the idea 
that frames shape policy formation.
1
 Specifically, in the U.S., a deeply-ingrained 
ideology of self-reliance has favored a framing of obesity primarily in terms of 
personal responsibility, despite growing attention to social-structural contributors 
(Kersh 2009; Lawrence 2004; Saguy and Almeling 2008; Saguy and Gruys 2010; 
Saguy, Gruys and Gong 2010). Likewise, U.S. policy approaches to obesity, such as 
labeling the caloric content of foods and educating the public about the alleged risks 
of obesity, have been overwhelming at the individual-level. Meanwhile, those who 
favor more aggressive regulation of the food industry have been trying to reframe 
rising body mass at the population level as a byproduct of food production and 
distribution (Brownell and Horgen 2003; Nestle 2002; Schlosser 2001). The more or 
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less explicit assumption, on the part of social actors and social analysts alike, is that 
policy follows framing. 
Yet, if we turn to France, we see quite a different picture. Here, where there is 
a strong political tradition of social solidarity through state-funded social programs 
and social security, obesity has been framed largely as an issue of corporate greed, 
social inequality, and the deficits of the welfare state (Bossy 2010; Saguy, Gruys and 
Gong 2010). However, France has adopted policies that are quite similar to those 
favored in the United States (Bergeron, Castel and Nouguez 2011; Bergeron, Castel 
and Nouguez 2013). With the exception of the removal of vending machines from 
schools, which had little impact on the larger soft drink and food industry, the French 
government – like the U.S. – has focused on non-binding ethic codes for the food 
industry and on educational campaigns to help individuals make better choices 
(Bergeron, Boubal and Castel Forthcoming; Bergeron, Castel and Dubuisson 2012). 
In other words, despite important differences in how obesity has been framed, both 
nations have adopted obesity policies that attempt to change individual-level 
behavior.  
Curiously, there is little extant research that sheds light on this sort of 
disconnect between dominant social problem framing and subsequent policies. This 
paper seeks to fill this hole in the literature.  Specifically, we ask: Under what 
conditions do dominant social problem frames shape policy solutions? Under what 
conditions may dominant frames and policies be mutually constitutive or, in contrast, 
mutually autonomous? This line of questioning generates new research questions and 
hypotheses to test in future research.  
 4 
Frames and Policy Instruments 
Following a large and diverse literature, we use the term frame broadly to refer 
to a public definition of a problem, which emphasizes some aspects of reality while 
obscuring others (Saguy 2013; Snow et al. 1986). Our use of the term frame 
encompasses similar concepts used by social scientists, such as causal story, policy 
image, collective definition, or public definition (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; 
Blumer 1971; Gusfield 1981; Stone 1989). Specific frames typically point to 
particular causes, ownership and responsibility, and solutions (Gusfield 1981). Frames 
vary in the extent to which they are grounded in well-defined theories (e.g., scientific 
or political) and the degree to which they imply moral judgments and other factors 
(Stone 1989).  
Policy makers, politicians, government officials, social movements, experts, 
administrative elites, or journalists may formulate competing social problem frames. 
For instance, different claimsmakers have framed obesity as either an issue of 
personal responsibility, a product of socio-cultural factors, or the result of 
biology/genetics (Saguy 2013). In some cases, one of these competing frames or a 
new combination of them emerges as the dominant social problem frame, as measured 
by prevalence in the news media, legislative debates and/or policy arenas (Hilgarten 
and Bosk 1988).
 
 That a frame is dominant is not to say that it is monolithic or without 
challengers. Nonetheless, it is sometimes possible to identify a frame that is evoked 
more often and carries more authority than others (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; 
Gusfield 1981; Hall 1993; Jobert and Müller 1987; Sabatier 1987). Thus, in the U.S. 
media, several studies have shown that the personal responsibility frame dominates, 
despite a growing focus on social-structural contributors (Kersh 2009; Lawrence 
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2004; Saguy and Almeling 2008; Saguy and Gruys 2010; Saguy, Gruys and Gong 
2010).  
Policy instruments is a generic term that refers to various techniques used by 
governing bodies to implement policy objectives (Howlett 1991). We conceptualize 
policy instruments as the product of political decisions and power relations that 
become partly autonomous technical devices with implications for subsequent 
political decisions and regulation (Lasalandra 1995; Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007). 
We use policy instrument broadly to speak collectively of social institutions like 
census taking or taxation, concrete devices like statistical nomenclature, and micro 
devices such as statistical categories (Bezes and Siné 2011). 
To the extent that policy instruments derive from the values, norms and causal 
assumptions designated by a dominant social problem frame, they can be said to be 
consistent with such frames. This is analogous to the (relatively coherent) relationship 
that Peter Hall establishes between the different levels of his policy paradigm and that 
Paul Sabatier describes between the different levels of his policy belief system (Hall 
1993; Hall 1997; Sabatier 1987; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). While there can 
be varying levels of consistency, we focus on clear cases of each. While determining 
consistency inevitably involves subjective assessment, we maintain that this can 
nonetheless be empirically established. 
Our article speaks to a central debate in the social movement literature about 
the extent to which social movements are able to shape policy decisions. While some 
scholars contend that social movements are generally successful at shaping policy 
decisions (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005; Nathanson 2007; Nathanson 2005), 
others have argued that they are rarely influential compared to other political actors, 
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institutions and processes (for an excellent review, see Amenta et al. 2010; Giugni 
2007). Yet, we do not limit our focus to social movements. Rather we are interested in 
collective action more broadly, on the part of a variety of social actors – including 
interest groups, experts, policy entrepreneurs, administrative officials, media, or a 
combination of them, as well as what several scholars have labeled ―advocacy 
coalitions‖ (Sabatier 1987; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), policy communities, or 
policy networks (see, for instance, Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Jordan 1990; Le Galès 
and Thatcher 1995; Marsh and Rodhes 1992).  
We do not aim to assess the multiple factors that shape the agenda setting 
process that has been examined elsewhere (see Amenta et al. 2010; Gamson 1990; 
Piven and Cloward 1978). Rather, we limit our attention to the more specific question 
of how and why dominant social problem frames are consistent (or not) with 
subsequent policy instruments. What interests us is the extent to which the policy 
instrumentation faithfully reflects dominant social problem framing of the issue. In 
other words, we probe the specific role played by ideas in public policy.  
Major Theoretical Perspectives 
 We draw upon three broad literatures in sociological and political science – 
which do not typically speak to each other – that theorize the link between social 
problem framing (or ideas, more generally) and policy solutions. These include the 
literatures on 1) framing and social movements; 2) social problem construction; and 
3) political theory on agenda setting, ideas-driven policy, and policy instruments. 
While there are important differences across (and within) these literatures, there are 
also important commonalities. Namely, each of these literatures tends to assume a 
high degree of coherence between social problem frames (or ideas) and policy 
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approaches. This coherence is most typically explained by the influence that frames 
have on policy approaches, although some scholars assert either that policy 
instruments shape social problem framing or that policy approaches constitute social 
problem framing. Notably, none of these literatures explicitly considers the possibility 
that a dominant frame will be inconsistent with subsequent policies (see Table 1). Yet, 
together these literatures provide insights and theoretical leverage for addressing this 
possibility. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Framing and Social Movements 
Scholars of framing and collective action examine the process through which 
people and groups ―frame, or assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and 
conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, 
to garner bystander support, and demobilize antagonists‖ (Snow and Benford 1988: 
198). Their key puzzle is typically to understand how collective mobilization emerges 
and forms, not how these frames subsequently shape policy decisions. For instance, in 
her examination of the success of frames in raising awareness and generating support 
for public funding of breast cancer research, Emily Kolker notes that her ―study 
makes no claims as to whether or not the frames themselves caused increases in 
funding‖ (Kolker 2004: 836).  
In a rare study, of homeless mobilization, that examines how frames shape 
policy decisions, Cress and Snow argue that social movements are more likely to be 
successful – defined as obtaining rights, representation within municipalities, and 
gaining resources and services – when they articulate specific and clear prognostic 
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and diagnostic frames (Cress and Snow 2000).  Yet, they do not specifically examine 
whether policy outcomes faithfully translate the social movement frames.  
While often left implicit, the framing and social movement literature typically 
implies that frames shape the policy solutions that are ultimately adopted (Williams 
1995).  For instance, Snow and colleagues write: ―Interpretive frames [..] not only 
inspire and justify collective action, but also give meaning to and legitimate the tactics 
that evolve‖ (Snow et al. 1986: 477). Specifically, Snow and colleagues argue that 
diagnostic frames identify problems and attribute responsibility whereas prognostic 
frames propose problem solutions. In attributing responsibility for a social problem, 
diagnostic frames, in effect, identify the locus of policy action, while prognostic 
frames imply actual policy solutions.  
In other words, this literature recognizes that frames are important not only in 
so far as they can help mobilize movement support and garner resources but also in 
that they favor the development of specific policy solutions. By extension, internal 
social movement disputes over specific problem frames are not only about 
maximizing resources and support but are also centrally disputes about which policy 
solutions to pursue. Emblematic of this implicit position, Kolker‘s three competing 
breast cancer frames all seek to obtain a specific form of government action: public 
financing of cancer research (Kolker 2004). 
The social movement literature has generally assumed that the same factors 
that favor social mobilization – including framing strategies – would favor political 
influence (Amenta et al. 2010). Yet, others have shown that some of the conditions 
that produce mobilization can, in fact, hinder influence at later stages in the policy 
process (Amenta et al. 2010). For instance, whereas having a large movement may 
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help to get an issue on the public agenda, it may subsequently make it more difficult 
for the movement to formulate and rally around specific policy recommendations 
(Amenta 2006; Amenta et al. 2010; Noy 2009). This opens the possibility that there 
may be a disconnect between the social movement frames that propel an issue onto 
the public agenda and the policy instruments that ultimately emerge. As Polletta and 
Ho (2006: 197) have noted, ―It is surprising, given the theoretical attestations to 
frames‘ importance, that studies systematically assessing frames‘ impacts remain 
relatively few‖ (see also Contamin 2010). 
Social Problem Construction 
Over forty years ago, Herbert Blumer wrote that the career and fate of social 
problems is the result of an ongoing ―process of collective definition‖ from an ―initial 
point of their appearance‖ to whatever may be the end point‖ (Blumer 1971: 301). He 
identified five stages of collective definition, including: 1) the emergence of social 
problems; 2) the legitimation of social problems; 3) the mobilization of action with 
regard to specific problems; 4) the formation of policy instruments (what he calls ―an 
official plan of action‖), and 5) the implementation of the policy instruments. Work in 
the social problem construction literature – as is also true for work on social 
movement framing discussed above – has focused mostly on #1, 2, and 3, while 
assuming that #4 follows automatically from #3. As we discuss below, other research 
has examined possible disconnect between #4 (policy instruments) and #5 
(implementation). Building on these literatures, we propose to systematically 
problematize the link between #3 (the mobilization of action with regard to specific 
problems) and #4 (policy instruments). 
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A subset of the literature on social problem construction, research on 
medicalization assumes that adopting a medical frame results in policy solutions that 
subject new areas of social life to medical authority (Conrad 1992; Conrad and 
Schneider 1992; Pfohl 1977). For instance, an extremely well-cited article 
(Summerfield 1999) argues the imposition of Western medical frames of 
posttraumatic stress syndrome has directly facilitated the massive development of 
programs addressing ―posttraumatic stress‖ in war zones abroad, which have become 
an increasingly prominent part of humanitarian aid operations backed by UNICEF, 
WHO, European Commission Humanitarian Office and many nongovernmental 
organizations.  
To take another example, in her examination of the politics of menopause, 
Frances McCrea concludes that the medicalization of menopause automatically leads 
to an individualization of the issue. As a result, ―the physician turns attention away 
from any social structural interpretations of women conditions‖ and the ―locus of the 
solution then becomes the doctor-patient interaction in which the physician is active, 
instrumental, and authoritative while the patient is passive and dependent‖ (McCrea 
1983: 113, emphasis added).  
Likewise, a wide literature on public health and preventive policies 
emphasizes how framing consumption of alcohol, tobacco, or ―junk food‖ in terms of 
individual responsibility contributes to the development of policies that ignore 
underlying structural and social determinants (Armstrong 1995; Tesh 1988). As noted 
by Moore and Frazer (2006: 3036), the dominance of personal responsibility frames 
means that individual citizens are increasingly held responsible for improving their 
health by quitting smoking, eating less fat, drinking less alcohol, or exercising more. 
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There has been a shift away from collective solidarity toward low-cost solutions and 
―a de-institutionalisation of health care, and promotion of more active forms of 
citizenship.‖ We build on and deepen the insights of this literature by addressing an 
issue that this literature has not specifically addressed: the conditions under which a 
dominant social problem frame will be either consistent or inconsistent with 
subsequent policy decisions. 
Political Science Theory 
While not always using the term frame, several political scientists have also 
taken up the question of how problem definitions, ―causal stories,‖ or ―ideas,‖ shape 
policy formation and outcomes (Baumgartner 2012; Hall 1993; Schmidt 2010). In 
discussing ―causal stories,‖ political scientist Deborah Stone asserts: ―competition to 
control causal stories does not stop once an issue reaches either the systemic or formal 
agenda. Causal stories continue to be important in the formulation and selection of 
alternative policy responses, because they locate the burdens of reform differently‖ 
(Stone 1989: 283).  
The literature on agenda setting, while not speaking specifically of frames nor 
citing the framing literature, is centrally concerned with how an issue is defined as a 
public problem. Like the sociological literature reviewed above, this literature points 
to cases in which the way an issue is defined shapes policy outcomes (e.g., 
Baumgartner and Jones 2009). For instance, Baumgartner and Jones (1991: 1044-45) 
argue that ―a single process can explain both periods of extreme stability and short 
bursts of rapid change.‖ This process is the interaction of existing set of political 
institutions, which they call ―venues,‖ and ―beliefs and values concerning a particular 
policy,‖ which they term ―policy image,‖ and which is very close to our 
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understanding of frame (Baumgartner and Jones 1991: 1044-45). They suggest a 
strong and unquestioned link between framing and venue, the latter of which 
encompasses the notions of responsibility and ownership of a problem: ―As venues 
change, images may change as well; as the image of a policy changes, venue changes 
become more likely‖ (Baumgartner and Jones 1991: 1047; see also Gilbert and Henry 
2009). Some of this work recognizes that problem definitions can also be tinkered 
with, so as to fit existing policy solutions ( ; Kingdon 1984). Both cases, 
however, imply consistency between policy solutions and social problem frames.  
Another strand of political science research – on ―ideas-driven policy‖ – 
asserts that ideas play a crucial role in policy formation, elaboration and change (Hall 
1993; Jobert and Muller 1987; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). While several of 
these authors acknowledge that policy instruments can ultimately drift away from the 
ideas that provided their original justification, they nonetheless suggest that policy 
changes initially follow changes in the construction of social reality. For instance, 
according to Peter Hall “policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas 
and standards that specify not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that 
can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to 
be addressing‖ (1993: 279). Specifically, Hall showed how neoliberal financial 
instruments emerged as a response to shifting ideas about the causes of and solutions 
for economic crises (Hall 1993). Similarly, Pierre Muller has argued that ―in doing 
public policy one does not ‗resolve‘ a problem as much as construct a new 
representation of problems that puts in place sociopolitical conditions of their 
treatment by society and, through the same action, structures the State‖ (Muller and 
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Surel 1998: 31, emphasis added). Pierre Muller‘s phrase ―ideas in action‖ clearly 
expresses the agentic power of ideas in his theory (Muller 1990: 71).  
As has been noted elsewhere (Surel 2000), much of Sabatier‘s more recent 
book chapters (Sabatier 1999) tend to assume that when a belief system, or, to put it 
differently, a frame of reference, or a paradigm, has won the (cognitive) competition, 
the choice of policy instruments and alternatives is more or less automatic. Yet, no-
one has yet offered a model that can address the issue of possible inconsistency 
between frames and policy instruments. We need a better theoretical model to make 
sense of the articulation between ideas and policy-making outcomes (e.g. policy 
program, law, plans, etc.) (Campbell 2002). Our efforts to respond to this hole in the 
literature are consistent with the move towards discursive institutionalism (DI), which 
aims to ―show empirically how, when, where, and why ideas and discourse matter for 
institutional change, and when they do not‖ (Schmidt 2010: 21). 
A recent study makes an important effort to systematically examine the impact 
of news media framing on policy (Rose and Baumgartner 2013). It shows that U.S. 
government policy towards the poor has become more stingy and punitive in the wake 
of a shift in news media framings that view the poor as victims of structural factors to 
those that cast them as lazy and as cheaters (Rose and Baumgartner 2013). Yet, this 
study leaves unanswered whether the rise in specific sorts of news media frames lead 
to policies that are informed by a similar frame. While this may not be of primary 
concern in poverty relief (i.e., what is important is whether the poor receive financial 
support, regardless of the justification given), it may be important in other situations. 
For instance, ―obesity prevention‖ policies that seek to reduce the level of obesity by 
charging heavier patients more for health insurance may be considered very different 
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than ―obesity prevention‖ policies that seek to reduce population weights by 
subsidizing fresh fruits and vegetables in low-income communities. 
In contrast to the literatures that view frames as shaping policy approaches, the 
literature on policy instruments considers that instruments, in the words of two French 
scholars, ―drive forward a certain representation of the problem‖ (Lascoumes and Le 
Galès 2007: 9). Or, in the words of Miller and Rose, ―the activity of problematizing is 
intrinsically linked to devising ways to seek to remedy it.  So, if a particular diagnosis 
or tool appears to fit a particular ‗problem‘, this is because they have been made so 
that they fit each other‖ (Miller and Rose 2008: 15). According to this formulation, 
policy instruments themselves constitute frames.  
Propositions 
 The literatures on social problem construction and framing and idea-driven 
political scientific models draw our attention to the central role frames play in social 
problem definition. Complementary to this, work by political scientists draws our 
attention to how policy evolves over time, as it moves through different stages and 
across distinct arenas. Drawing on the scattered insights from these broad traditions 
and bringing them together into a common theoretical framework, we propose a more 
systematic examination of the articulation between social problem definition and 
policy instrumentation. 
We extend Spector and Kitsuse‘s insight that a social problem may be 
reconceptualized during the policy making process (Spector and Kitsuse 1973). 
Following Blumer, as well, we are interested in how ―the plan as put into action‖ is 
―modified, twisted and reshaped, and takes unforeseen accretions,‖ as those who stand 
to benefit or, alternatively, to risk losing advantages attempt to shape the emerging 
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policies to their advantage (Blumer 1971: 304). However, contrary to Blumer, we are 
interested in how the modifications, twists, and reshaping are produced when policy 
instruments are designed, rather than when they are implemented. In other words, we 
examine a stage over which Blumer and others have glossed: the development of 
policy instruments and the rank ordering among them (a very politicized hierarchy). 
In sum, we systematically link the stages of the design and implementation of policy 
instruments, which, until now, have been examined in relative isolation. 
For the purpose of this paper, we focus on cases in which the policy 
instruments are either clearly consistent or clearly inconsistent with dominant frames. 
In cases of (clear) inconsistency, policy instruments do not address the main issues 
and causes identified by the dominant definition (Polletta and Ho 2006).  
We acknowledge but bracket a large body of work showing that the 
organization of political systems and national institutional rules – such as 
fragmentation vs. centralization of the state, a more or less open democratic regime, 
few or numerous accesses of opportunities for social movements to shape policy 
making, neo-corporatism vs. pluralism, location of veto points, institutional power 
structures and relations, and so on – influence political behaviors and power (Amenta, 
Carruthers and Zylan 1992; McCann 2006). While we do not develop specific 
propositions based on these particular factors, we take them into account in 
developing several of our propositions. Future work could go farther to develop 
additional propositions to assess how the different factors we identify would vary in 
their importance by national context. However, this is beyond the scope of our paper.  
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We develop three broad categories of propositions, related to: 1) qualities of 
the social actors involved in framing; 2) qualities of the frames themselves, and 3) the 
ecology of social problems (Abbott 2005). 
Qualities of Social Actors Involved in Framing 
As Gusfield (1981) explicitly recognizes, there can be a disjunction between 
what he calls ownership (the ability to create and influence a public definition of a 
problem), causation (an assertion about the sequence that factually accounts for the 
existence of a problem), and political responsibility (the office or person charged with 
solving the problem). In his words, ―while all three may coincide in the same office or 
person, that is by no means necessarily the case.  Quite often those who own a 
problem are trying to place obligations on others to behave in a ―proper‖ fashion and 
thus to take political responsibility for its solution‖ (Gusfield 1981: 14). Stated 
differently, those having formulated the dominant frame are often but not always 
influential in the formulation of policy instruments. We expect that policy instruments 
are more likely to be consistent with a dominant frame when those having formulated 
the latter are influential in the design of the former. 
Others have discussed this in terms of political opportunity (Cress and Snow 
2000; Giugni 2007; Nathanson 2005). Sociologist William Gamson points to this in 
his concept of inclusion, in which challengers gain state positions – and thus policy 
influence – via election or appointment (Gamson 1990). In some cases, dominant 
frames are developed to appeal to a potential institutional ally, already taking political 
expediency into account. Skrentny (2006) implicitly evokes this argument when he 
urges scholars to study and understand policy-elite perceptions of social movements 
and the groups they represent. For others, frames may be elaborated with an eye 
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towards the existing institutional and ―discursive opportunities‖ (Ferree 2003). In 
these cases, dominant frames are more likely to be consistent with resulting policy 
instruments.  
 For example, Korean national bankruptcy laws – passed in 2005 – were 
framed in ways that were very consistent with international bankruptcy regulation, or 
―global scripts,‖ in large part because one of the drafters of the national law was also 
a delegate to the international organization that had produced the global script the 
year before (Halliday and Carruthers 2009). Likewise, Indonesian bankruptcy laws, 
passed in 1998, had echoed global scripts because International Financial Institutions 
found local allies who had framed the national laws in ways that were consistent with 
international regulation (Halliday and Carruthers 2009).  
This is supported by the observation that social mobilization is more 
influential in cases of a supportive political regime and domestic bureaucrats than in 
cases lacking a such support (Amenta et al. 2010). Similarly, it adheres to what Cress 
and Snow found in their study of homeless social movement organizations (SMOs); 
SMOs were more likely to prevail when they had either political or administrative 
allies in the municipality (Cress and Snow 2000). This proposition is also supported 
by work showing that social movements are more likely to influence policy outcomes 
when they have elite sponsorship (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998). 
This can be stated in terms of the following proposition: 
Proposition 1a: Dominant frames and policy instruments are more likely to be 
consistent with each other when those having formulated the frames are also 
influential in the development of the policy instruments. 
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In other cases, those having formulated the dominant frame are not directly 
involved in the development of policy instruments because they have little interest in 
the concrete consequences of policy instruments. This situation often leads to 
inconsistency between dominant frame and policy instruments. The case, of 
homelessness framing and policy in the early 2000s in San Francisco provides an 
example of this (Noy 2009). The majority of actors in the political field of debates 
over homelessness – who were situated primarily on the political left and center – 
ascribed to a ―structural‖ frame of homelessness that blamed systematic factors such 
as lack of affordable housing, living wage jobs or health care. However, those on the 
political right – who framed homelessness as a problem of individual deficiencies, 
including mental illness, substance abuse, and lifestyle choices, as well as a problem 
of inefficient bureaucracy – were able to use their greater economic resources to 
propose ballot initiatives consistent with that framing (Noy 2009). Lack of 
cooperation and bitter fighting between the political left and political center, despite 
their shared framing of the issue, further weakened them in relation to the political 
right (Noy 2009). The result was an ―un unremitting, stable polarized conflict, in 
which neither left nor right were able to win a resounding political victory, nor were 
they able to dominate the creation of homeless policy according to their diagnostic 
framing‖ (Noy 2009: 236). At best, each side was able to block the initiatives of the 
other but not pass its own preferred policies, and, as a result, the city was never able 
to develop a coherent homeless policy. 
This insight dovetails with research documenting the ways in which political 
staff and bureaucrats often end up distorting the content of social demands in ways 
that serve their own professional interests (Immergut 1992; Skocpol 1993), while 
 19 
further specifying the conditions under which such a distortion is likely. These 
examples lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1b: Dominant frames and policy instruments are less likely to be 
consistent with each other when sponsors of a competing frame are more 
influential, than the sponsors of the dominant frame, in the design of policy 
instruments. 
Qualities of Frames 
 We can develop a further set of propositions based on the characteristics of the 
frames themselves. Just as Amenta and colleagues have shown that social 
movement‘s influence over the public agenda is likely to be limited for policies ―for 
which high levels of political or material resources are at stake,‖ such as military 
matters, so we predict that frames will be less likely to be consistent with policy 
instruments when the social problem definition implies a need for major institutional 
restructuration (Amenta et al. 2010: 295; See also Ferree 2003). As a subset of this, a 
dominant frame that threatens existing policies, especially those that serve powerful 
constituencies or constitute established entitlement programs, is less likely to prevail 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Hacker 1998). For instance, in times of fiscal hardship, 
expensive policy solutions face an uphill battle, regardless of how consistent they are 
with dominant framing. Stated as a proposition: 
Proposition 2a. Dominant frames are less likely to be consistent with policy 
instruments when they imply a need for major institutional or political 
restructuration or redistribution.  
 The corollary of proposition 2a is that dominant frames are more likely to be 
consistent with policy instruments when they do not require major institutional or 
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political restructuration or redistribution. One scenario involves cases in which a 
social problem frame is developed in order to be consistent with a popular solution 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Stone 1989). In this case, political entrepreneurs frame 
a public problem in such a way as to be fixable with an existing policy solution that 
has wide public support and which they champion and thus to build alliances 
―between groups who have problems and groups who have solutions‖ (Stone 1989: 
298).  
To take a different example, if American feminist lawyers came to frame 
sexual harassment as a form of sex-based discrimination in employment in the late 
1970s, it was because they were trying to frame this issue in such a way that it would 
fall under the jurisdiction of an existing statute, specifically Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which made it illegal for employers to discriminate on the basis 
of sex (Saguy 2003). Likewise, one key to SMO success is to adopt, and even 
sometimes alter, their mobilization frames to appeal to political decision makers or 
courts (Amenta 2006; Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan 1992; Soule and King 2006). 
Similarly, social movements are more likely to be successful when their frames do not 
challenge basic power structures, such as, for instance, traditional gender roles 
(McCammon et al. 2001).  
A study of bureaucracy in Lesotho, a small landlocked African country 
completely surrounded by South Africa, provides an excellent illustration of this 
(Ferguson 1994). It shows that, if poverty has been framed in terms of technical 
problems – such as isolation and lack of markets, credit, education, fertilizer and 
tractors – it is because these are the sorts of problems that agencies in charge of 
designing anti-poverty policy can address by spending the money that has been 
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entrusted to them. In contrast, because they are ill equipped to address more 
fundamental problems – such as unemployment, low wages, political subjugation by 
South Africa, or entrenched bureaucratic elites – they have not framed poverty policy 
in these terms (Ferguson 1994). 
These expectations can be reformulated in the terms of path dependency 
(Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Pierson 2000). This perspective maintains that policies, 
once enacted, constrain those that are likely to pass in the future by establishing 
public expectations and networks of vested interests. Consequently, policy 
entrepreneurs are more effective when they frame a problem so that it points to 
solutions that do not threaten the interests of those networks or violate the 
expectations of the general public (see, for instance, Hacker 1998). Stated as a 
proposition: 
Proposition 2b. Dominant frames are more likely to be consistent with policy 
instruments when they involve no major institutional or political restructuration  
or redistribution. 
Our final proposition deals with frames those are purposely vague, internally 
contradictory, comprehensive (in the sense that they address all possible dimensions 
of a public problem) or highly complex (i.e., involve many interrelated causal paths). 
Those frame qualities – that we collectively term ambiguity – often help mobilize 
adherents to a cause but do not dictate an obvious policy path (Polletta and Ho 2006) 
or a clear hierarchy of policy instruments. 
In the case of obesity, a shared but vague framing of higher body weight as 
medically pathological has allowed, in the US, a wide range of social actors to gloss 
over different views regarding the causes of weight gain and appropriate public health 
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responses to it (Saguy 2013). In other words, diverse commentators disagree about 
why people are getting fatter and how to reverse trends in ―obesity,‖ while concurring 
that higher body weights represent a pressing medical and public health problem. 
Such vague framing helps mobilizes wide public support, since concern over a given 
issue is more likely to spread when there are multiple causal frames available and 
when it is possible to gloss over disagreements regarding these frames, so long as the 
issue itself is generally acknowledged to be a problem (Strang and Meyer 1993). 
However, this vagueness, while helpful in mobilizing diverse stakeholders, becomes a 
liability when it comes to policy instrumentation, as it designates no clear policy path.  
To take another example, the Townsend Plan, a very successful organization 
for organizing the elderly, gained a million members very quickly in 1934 but was 
subsequently unable to present coherent testimony in Congress (Amenta 2006). In 
sum, vague policy or legal requirements open a space for precision via policy 
instruments (Carpenter 2010; Edelman, Abraham and Erlanger 1992; Edelman, 
Uggen and Erlanger 1999).  
 A frame may also be internally contradictory so that it is potentially consistent 
with two or more competing – or complementary – problem definitions and favored 
solutions. Precisely because such frames do not clearly designate a specific policy 
solution, it is difficult to determine the extent to which they are consistent with the 
policy solutions that are finally decided upon. 
Frames can also be complex. According to Stone, complex frames ―are not 
very useful in politics, precisely because they do not offer a single locus of control, a 
plausible candidate to take responsibility for a problem, or a point of leverage to fix a 
problem‖ (Stone, 1998, 289). Yet, in some situations, a complex frame might mean 
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that those responsible for the instrumentation process have greater room for maneuver 
through which they can favor the policy options (or the hierarchy of policy options) 
that best serve their interest. For instance, the growing emphasis in France on obesity 
as caused by sedentary lifestyle points to so many factors and responsible parties (e.g., 
car manufacturers, city planners and authorities, sport facilities, elevators, escalators, 
air conditioners, heating systems of buildings, and gender equality) that it ultimately 
holds no one responsible (Olivier et al. 2013). This situation offers opportunities for 
certain groups to push for their preferred policy solutions.  
Finally, frames can be comprehensive in the sense that they address all 
possible dimensions of a public problem, including all possible sources of 
responsibility, ownership and causality without establishing any hierarchy among 
them. This was the case of the heterogeneous movement in favor of promoting the 
diversity of patient groups in clinical trials in the U.S. (Epstein 2007). Many different 
kinds of actors rallied behind a social problem that addressed four different versions 
of representation, including in the statistical sense, in the sense of social visibly, in the 
sense of political voice and in the symbolic sense. At the end of the day, the 
legislature and governmental agencies interpreted representation in the narrow, 
statistical sense. Not surprisingly, this elicited some discord. 
 More generally, those who feel that their initial formulation of a problem is 
not reflected in the ultimate policy instrumentation process are likely to criticize what 
they see as a denaturation of their cause and attempt to redefine a problem, similar to 
Halliday and Carruthers‘ recursivity process (Halliday and Carruthers 2009). In 
contrast, those benefiting from the final set of policy options are likely to stress the 
continuity that they see between frame and instruments. Stated as a proposition: 
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Proposition 2c: When dominant frames are intentionally ambiguous (i.e., vague, 
complex, internally contradictory or comprehensive), the extent of consistency 
with subsequent policy instruments is difficult to determine. 
Ecology of social problems  
 Of course, social problem frames and policy instruments do not operate in a 
vacuum. Rather, both are developed within specific policy arenas (Hilgarten and Bosk 
1988) or ecologies (Abbott 2005) that influence the extent to which social problem 
frames and policy instruments are consistent with each other. Specifically, policy 
instruments are expected to be inconsistent with frames when there has been a change 
to an institutional context that is characterized by a logic undermining the dominant 
frame. For instance, while Austria adopted the U.S. definition of sexual harassment in 
its own laws, differences in these countries legal institutions led to very different 
policy instrumentation (Cahill 2001). 
Moreover, once a problem is on the agenda with a stabilized definition, the 
development of consistent policy instruments may be impeded because such 
instruments would threaten the resolution of other social problems. For instance, 
environmental and health policy frames may emphasize corporate responsibility. 
While these frames are consistent with the goals of the environment and health 
agencies in which they are being developed, they may nonetheless meet resistance – 
even within these same agencies – because of their perceived negative implications 
for employment and the perceived debt crisis. To put it more crudely, these frames 
point to solutions that may be seen as threatening the objectives of another ecology: 
the financial and budgetary governmental bodies. 
Proposition 3a: Policy instruments are likely to be inconsistent with dominant 
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frames when they have been designed within an ecology that is organized around 
a different logic. 
 The corollary of Proposition 3a follows:    
Proposition 3b: Policy instruments are likely to be consistent with dominant 
frames when both have been designed within the same ecology or in ecologies 
that are organized around a consistent logic. 
 For analytical purposes, we have treated each of these propositions separately, 
but we, of course, recognize that there are interactions across these different factors. 
For instance, it has been shown that, compared to those with access to decision 
makers, social actors who lack access or prefer to remain independent from public 
authorities are more likely to formulate radical frames (Bernstein 1997; Epstein 1996; 
Ferree 2003). Radical frames, in turn, are more likely to challenge existing policy 
instruments – or interests in different ecologies – and therefore to be inconsistent with 
subsequent policy.  
In contrast, actors who are more integrated into the power structure may be 
more likely to develop frames that are designed to be consistent with existing policy 
instruments or, at least, do not challenge other policy priorities (Kingdon 1984). 
Insiders are likely to face more resistance when they develop more radical frames that 
threaten powerful interests, although if they have enough power and influence, they 
may be able to prevail (Nathanson 2005). To take another example, some policy 
instruments are likely to find strong support because of how they are located within 
broader policy ecology. For instance, European activists, who defined bike paths as a 
solution to various urban environmental problems, have built close relationships with 
municipalities, some even being recruited by city-level administration. These 
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privileged relationships helped activists define bike paths as a solution that fit several 
different institutional logics, thus facilitating the support of numerous constituencies 
inside cities‘ administration, including transportation, urban renewal and road safety. 
Finally, the private investment in these bike paths made this solution economically 
viable for cities (Huré 2013). 
There are many other kinds of interaction that could be established that we 
hope will be pursued in subsequent research. Future research could also investigate 
whether there are typical patterns among these different factors that lead to 
consistency or inconsistency between dominant frame and policy instruments.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
We have offered a set of propositions predicting how the characteristics of 
frames, qualities of actors and relevant ecologies inform the relative consistency 
between social problem frames and policy. This is both a central research question for 
social movement scholars and one that has so far received surprisingly little empirical 
attention. To understand the effect of a social movement, it is not enough to establish 
a link between social activism and policy outcomes; we also need to examine the 
degree of conceptual consistency between the two. For instance, it is possible that a 
social movement is successful in getting an issue on the public agenda and getting a 
policy instrument implemented to address it, but that the specific policy solution only 
addresses part of its diagnosis or, even worse, runs counter to its objectives. 
Moreover, identifying the extent of consistency between frames and policy 
instruments provides a means to assess the relative influence of social movements 
relative to other factors. Such an approach therefore helps assess the net contribution 
of the ―collective action frame variable‖ to the success of social  movements in 
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particular, and of collective action in general. It therefore allows a more evidence-
based assessment of the extent to which public political debates matter and in which 
cases. 
Our analysis suggests that political opportunity structure is not only relevant 
during the initial phase of social problem construction but also when policy 
instruments are designed. Stated differently, even when social movements or other 
actors are able to impose a given social problem frame, other groups may seize 
control of the problem definition at the level of policy design and implementation. 
Our approach provides a theoretical framework for better understanding cases in 
which culturally resonant frames sometimes do not translate into policy, for structural, 
political or economic reasons. More broadly, our approach provides a key for 
identifying the conditions under which cultural schemas and material resources do or 
do not articulate (Sewell 1992). 
If social movement research has ignored cases of inconsistency between social 
movement frames and policy, it may very well be due to an overreliance on the U.S. 
case. In the United States, there reigns both a strong ideology of individualism and 
also various economic and political pressures towards policies that are cheap and do 
not challenge structural arrangements. As a result, it is easy to overestimate either the 
power of individualist ideology or of economic and political structures, depending on 
one‘s focus, in that these two tendencies converge.  
For example, in the case of obesity, existing theories seem to map relatively 
well onto the American case, in that obesity has been framed primarily in terms of 
personal responsibility, and policy instruments likewise focus on individual behavior. 
Yet, it may be that these policy approaches are responding as much to political and 
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economic constraints as to American ideology about self-determination. As noted by 
Sylvia Nobel Tesh, policies that emphasize individual responsibility are much cheaper 
and less politically controversial than those that seek to make major changes in 
industrial practices, the economy, or in the government (Tesh 1988). These policies, 
in turn, reinforce an ideological commitment, even an unquestioned assumption, of 
individual responsibility. Examining countries – like France – in which the dominant 
ideology exists in tension with economic and political pressures makes it more likely 
that we will observe inconsistency between dominant frames and policy.  
An epistemological and methodological implication is that it is not only cases 
in which policy instruments are inconsistent with social problem frames that beg 
explanation. Rather, cases in which policy instruments and social problem frames are 
consistent also demand a rigorous social explanation. This consistency should not be 
taken for granted but rather needs to be considered an explanandum, or a dependent 
variable that requires explanation. In other words, we take a symmetrical stance, in 
which the same sorts of explanation are used to explain consistency and inconsistency 
between social problem frames and policy instruments (Bloor 1976).  
Moreover, our approach examines political struggle that extend beyond the 
mass media and classic political venues – like Congress, Senate, Parliament, political 
parties, trade unions, and so on –to also examine social settings and political arenas 
that have attracted less attention from political scientists and sociologists, such as 
administrative bureaus, agencies, and so on (see also Hood 1986; Lascoumes and Le 
Galès 2007). These other arenas may be less visible (Gilbert and Henry 2012), but this 
does not mean that they are any less contentious or that they matter less. 
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Finally, future research should examine the consequences of implementing 
policy instruments that are inconsistent with social problem frames. We predict that a 
strong discrepancy between frames and policy instruments can create new 
opportunities for social actors to challenge the legitimacy of those policy instruments. 
In contrast, the implementation of inconsistent policy instruments might foster the 
diffusion of novel understandings of the problem. This, in turn, may inform 
subsequent debate over the problem and potential solutions. In other words, policy 
instruments may contribute to the emergence of what we would call ―instrument-
driven frames.‖  
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